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1. Introduction 
When the Kyoto Protocol was first being hammered out (1995-97), nego-
tiations were marked by distinct strategies of key actors.1 The European 
Union (EU) took the role as frontrunner – pushing for short-term, 
ambitious emissions cuts for Annex I countries – while the United States 
teamed up with like-minded countries in the Umbrella group and pushed 
for maximum use of mechanisms for flexible implementation of commit-
ments.2, 3 The Umbrella group was an important actor in the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations, and consisted of Japan, the United States, Canada, 
Australia, Russia, Ukraine, New Zealand, Iceland and Norway.4 The 
other ‘economies in transition’ supported the Umbrella group’s stance.5 
The Group of 77 (G77) and China, meanwhile, supported the EU position 
that Annex I countries should take the first steps towards emissions 
reductions, but fiercely refused to commit to any binding emissions re-
ductions themselves.6 Ten years later, negotiations continue but many of 
the key strategies have shifted, and the roles of the key actors have 
changed. The most dramatic change came when the United States in 2001 
decided to withdraw from further cooperation in the Kyoto Protocol, on 
grounds that the agreement would be harmful to the US economy. 
In our study of the importance of strategy shifts among these key actors 
after the US withdrew from Kyoto, we start with a distinct introvert ap-
proach. More specifically, we focus on domestic climate policy develop-
ment and discuss how domestic politics shape negotiation positions and 
strategies. We look into the four actor’s current positions, if and how 
their strategies have changed both with respect to the Kyoto Protocol and 
other key actors, and how their role in climate negotiations has devel-
oped.  
We argue that a more pronounced split between the EU on the one side 
and G77/China and the USA on the other has occurred, this view is rein-
forced by the recent establishment of the The Asia-Pacific Partnership for 
Clean Development and Climate (APP4CDC).7 Moreover, Russia plays 
an even more pivotal role than it did earlier. Russia’s signature on the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997 was to a considerable extent caused by expecta-
tions of large revenues from quota sales to the United States. When the 
US pulled out of Kyoto the relationship with the EU gained in import-
ance. Russia delayed its decision to ratify the Protocol for several years. 
Knowing that the Protocol’s entry into force hinged solely on own action, 
Russia demanded side-payments, particularly from the EU. But this 
process has also brought Russia and the EU closer together in climate 
policy and Russia now has deeper common interests with the EU in 
future negotiations than it has had before. 
Our argument is founded on the changes in the dynamics of the climate 
negotiations after the US repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol. What had 
previously appeared to be a growing recognition by domestic actors in the 
United States that climate change had to be addressed abruptly changed 
as a result of the Bush administration’s new policy. 8 At the international 
level, it motivated the remaining parties to overcome controversies and 
resolve undecided issues at COP6 bis in Bonn and COP7 in Marrakech – 
the same issues which led to the failure at COP6 in The Hague. While 
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negotiations in Marrakech in 2001 were not visibly disturbed by the 
United States’ new role,9 this was not the case at COP8 in New Delhi.10 
At COP8, the EU and most Annex I-parties were eager to build on the 
positive atmosphere from the UN World Summit on Sustainable Devel-
opment in Johannesburg in 2002 and initiate a discussion of post-2012 
issues, which would include future commitments also for non-Annex I-
parties. However, the United States had shifted both rhetoric and strategy, 
and now supported G77 in their rejection of discussing future (post-2012) 
commitments.11 As a result, the Umbrella group is now more divided, 
with the US and Australia teamed up supporting a different set of posi-
tions than the rest of the group.  
2. Analytical framework and methodology 
A total of 155 countries and the European Union representing 61.6 % of 
total CO2-emissions in industrialized countries12 in 1990 have ratified the 
treaty.13 Annex I minus the United States and Australia represent some 29 
per cent of global GHG emissions (2000). We have selected four key 
actors (the United States, China, the EU, and Russia) for our multiple 
case study (Yin 1984). The four are the largest emitters of GHGs in the 
world, and the climate regime’s effectiveness is closely knit to them (see 
figures 1 and 2). 
In their capacity as pivotal actors, they have during different stages of the 
climate negotiations served as dynamos, leaders, or barriers to further 
commitments and environmental effectiveness of the regime. 
In our study of the importance of strategy shifts among these key actors 
after the US withdrew from Kyoto, we start with a distinct introvert 
approach. More specifically, we focus on domestic climate policy devel-
opment and discuss how domestic politics shape negotiation positions 
and strategies. We look into the four actor’s current positions, if and how 
their strategies have changed both with respect to the Kyoto Protocol and 
other key actors, and how their role in climate negotiations has devel-
oped.  
We argue that a more pronounced split between the EU on the one side 
and G77/China and the USA on the other has occurred, and that Russia 
plays an even more pivotal role than it did earlier. Russia would have 
preferred US ratification and delayed its decision to ratify the Protocol for 
several years. Knowing that the Protocol’s entry into force hinged solely 
on own action, Russia demanded side-payments. In the process of 
evaluating whether to ratify or not, Russia shifted its strategy from 
supporting the US positions until the United States decided to withdraw, 
into successfully bending the EU position after own preferences after the 
US pullout. As a consequence, Russia now has deeper common interests 
with the EU in future negotiations than it has had before. 
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Figure 1: Relative distribution of global GHG emissions in 2000, 
including CO2 from fossil fuels and cement, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, 
and SF6, but not CO2 from land use changes  
Source: CAIT (WRI 2004) 
Figure 2: GHG emissions of the world’s four largest emitters in total 
(left axis) and their GHG emissions per capita (right axis). Figures in 
CO2-equivalents for the year 2000  
GHG emissions total and per capita (2000)
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Our argument is founded on the changes in the dynamics of the climate 
negotiations after the US repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol. What had 
previously appeared to be a growing recognition by domestic actors in the 
United States that climate change had to be addressed abruptly changed 
as a result of the Bush administration’s new policy. 14 At the international 
level, it motivated the remaining parties to overcome controversies and 
resolve undecided issues at COP6 bis in Bonn and COP7 in Marrakech – 
the same issues which led to the failure at COP6 in The Hague. While 
negotiations in Marrakech in 2001 were not visibly disturbed by the 
United States’ new role,15 this was not the case at COP8 in New Delhi.16 
At COP8, the EU and most Annex I-parties were eager to build on the 
positive atmosphere from the UN World Summit on Sustainable Devel-
opment in Johannesburg in 2002 and initiate a discussion of post-2012 
issues, which would include future commitments also for non-Annex I-
parties. However, the United States had shifted both rhetoric and strategy, 
and now supported G77 in their rejection of discussing future (post-2012) 
commitments.17 As a result, the Umbrella group is now more divided, 
with the US and Australia teamed up supporting a different set of posi-
tions than the rest of the group.  
In the next sections of the report, we elaborate on possible consequences 
for the climate regime resulting from the new alliances at COP8 and 
COP9, and the emerging split between the EU on the one side and 
G77/China and the United States on the other concerning the focus of 
future negotiations. We look first into domestic climate policy trends in 
the EU, the United States, China, and Russia and demonstrate how these 
policy trends have consequences for the international regime. For each 
actor we analyze the role and interests of key domestic actors, since nego-
tiations are more than a game between unitary rational actors that pursue 
their national interests from a rational cost-benefit perspective; they are 
also a struggle between negotiators involved in complex ‘two-level 
games’ taking place simultaneously at the international and domestic 
levels.18 We also focus on how and why environmental NGOs and other 
non-state actors, such as the major oil corporations, influence policy 
development. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of the shifting 
strategies for the future dynamics of the climate negotiations and the 
climate regime. 
3. Key actors changing negotiation strategies 
As a result of the Kyoto Protocol, an increasing number of domestic and 
non-state actors are becoming more directly affected by joint interna-
tional commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Among the four 
key actors in this study, only the EU and Russia have taken on mandatory 
measures to comply with or implement the international climate regime. 
However, all of the four key actors are confronted with, and to a varying 
degree take into account, the need to address global climate change. The 
ways in which these actors have responded, however, vary considerably. 
The distribution of costs and benefits among key target groups as well as 
a number of other factors play a crucial role in explaining why this policy 
process turns out to be so different in these four key climate actors.19 It 
also gives us a better explanation for their positions and strategies in the 
international negotiations. 
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3.1 The EU 
The EU has had strong leadership ambitions ever since the climate 
change problem emerged on the international agenda in the late 1980s. 
As a pusher for setting short-term commitments, and keeping the focus of 
the negotiations within the ‘targets and timetables’ framework, the EU 
had reasonably good success. The EU leadership role in the negotiations 
escalated markedly after the United States rejected the Kyoto Protocol in 
2001. At the time, the EU was the only actor with sufficient political 
energy and strength to push for the adoption of the Protocol. Considering 
the US reservations to engage on the issue, it represented a rather rare 
‘window of opportunity’ for EU leadership on the international scene. 
Thus, it is not only concern for the environment but also more general 
political ambitions to stand forth as a united and forceful actor that 
motivates EU climate policy.20 
The EU has historically been rather sceptical to the use of Kyoto mechan-
isms, favouring instead a climate strategy based on co-ordinated policies 
and measures (PAMs), and pushing for limitations on the use of the 
Kyoto mechanisms. However, there has been a remarkable change since 
the third Conference of the Parties (COP) in Kyoto in 1997, culminating 
in the adoption of a directive for pan-European emissions trading set to 
commence in 2005,21 and a directive for the inclusion of project-based 
mechanisms as cornerstones in EU climate policy.22 On this account the 
EU could today be regarded as a frontrunner in the development and im-
plementation of the Kyoto mechanisms.23 Responsible for 14% of total 
GHG emissions (EU-25), and with a growing economy, what the EU 
does to reduce emissions has an important imprint on potential climate 
change. Over the past two decades EU emissions are reduced, and accom-
panied by moderate population growth and substantial growth in econ-
omic output (See figure 3). Reduction in CO2 emissions in the EU area is 
mainly a result of radical reforms of the energy sectors in UK and East 
Germany, mainly due to other factors than environmental policy.  
Figure 3: Economic development, population growth and emissions 
of CO2 in the European Union (EU-15) for the period of 1971 to 2000 
Source: CAIT (WRI 2004) 
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Lessons learned from international negotiations as well as experiences 
from the development of EU climate policy have played key roles in the 
process of changing attitudes to climate policy options. Green NGOs 
played a key activist role, together with scientists providing expertise, in 
putting the challenge of global warming high on EU’s political agenda in 
the latter half of the 1980s. After negotiations were formalised in the 
early 1990s the governments took control over the process, and the influ-
ence of various green groups was reduced.24 NGOs have nonetheless been 
able to use their limited resources to stamp their imprint on the climate 
regime. Nearly all environmental NGOs in the climate change negotia-
tions co-ordinate their positions through the Climate Action Network 
(CAN), a global network of almost 300 NGOs working to reduce GHG 
emissions to ecologically sustainable levels.25  
At the international level, negotiations and social interaction with other 
actors showed the EU that the Kyoto mechanisms provided a condition 
sin qua none for some countries to commit to legally binding emission re-
duction targets. Hence, the slow progress in the negotiation process, the 
US repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, and the need to 
prevent other Annex I countries from abandoning the Kyoto process 
gradually led the EU to change its position and become more prone to 
making concessions, and thereby take leadership when the hegemon re-
signed. Another mitigating factor is that developments during the 1990s 
brought evidence that achieving the EU’s Kyoto target could prove to be 
more difficult than previously expected. The use of emissions trading was 
increasingly seen as important to ensure cost-effective implementation of 
climate policies.26 
At the EU level, the protracted development of EU climate policy and in-
creased learning about the Kyoto mechanisms gradually led to changes in 
preferences and policy. More specifically, the difficulties and barriers 
experienced in formulating a common and co-ordinated climate policy, 
the centrepiece of which was the proposal for a common carbon tax, 
served to reinforce the search for other policy instruments better suited 
for the EU context. Constituencies in the EU were supportive of climate 
change policy action, and governments were trying to reap the green vote. 
Furthermore, the support from both environmental and business NGOs in 
favour of prompt action to address climate change helped create a 
consensus about early action. Once a broad consensus had been reached 
among the complex group of countries, institutions, and stakeholders 
(such as proactive business NGOs, environmental NGOs, and govern-
ments trying to harvest the green vote) that must be involved to imple-
ment EU policy, it was difficult to change course.27 The sheer complexity 
of the EU policymaking machinery impedes any abrupt changes in policy 
course. Thus when the US withdrew from the Kyoto process, too much 
was at stake and invested in the process for the EU to change path. The 
logical alternative was therefore to ensure that the Protocol with its 
mechanisms for flexible implementation worked.28 
Besides learning from policy failure and institutional and political con-
straints, there has also been a process of learning more about the Kyoto 
mechanisms as such within the EU institutions and at the Member State 
level. Until Kyoto, the concept of mechanisms for flexible implementa-
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tion was a territory little explored by the EU, and knowledge was essen-
tially limited to academic circles and businesses following debates on 
emissions trading in the United States. After COP3, however, work was 
intensified within the Commission, during which social interaction with 
actors outside the EU and learning about other countries positions played 
a key role. A similar learning process is also evident within the European 
Parliament, which has had rather limited knowledge on the use of market-
based mechanisms in general, and the Kyoto mechanisms in particular.29 
Finally, it is important to recognise that opinions and positions on the use 
of Kyoto mechanisms have differed among Member States. In general, 
there appears to be a line of demarcation between Northern-European 
countries that tend to be more susceptible towards market-based instru-
ments and Anglo-American liberal norms, and Member States like 
Germany and France that historically have been more inclined towards 
command-and-control approaches. Important in this respect is the start-up 
of domestic emissions trading schemes in Denmark and the UK, includ-
ing also the set-up of procurement programs in the Netherlands for the 
purchase of credits from CDM and JI projects.  
In terms of future challenges, two issues clearly stand out: First, it will be 
critical for the EU to facilitate the development of an efficient and liquid 
market for emissions trading at the pan-European and international level. 
This might serve as an example for other countries that mechanisms for 
flexible implementation can work as climate policy measures without 
ruining the economy. Second, the EU needs to ensure the development of 
a multilateral climate regime for the period after 2012 that is based on 
participation and commitments from a larger number of countries, includ-
ing also developing countries. To achieve this, it is crucial that the EU 
meet its Kyoto commitment target.30 Slow economic growth and difficult-
ies in adjusting industries and work places to the new, globalizing eco-
nomy in the 1990s proved that it may be more difficult than previously 
expected for the EU to meet its Kyoto target. If even the EU – the fore-
most advocate of the Kyoto Protocol – proves to be unable to comply, the 
signal effect could be devastating for the future of the Protocol and 
severely affect the dynamics of negotiations about future commitments. 
The EU has lately expressed preference for the multi-stage approach, 
saying that ‘the “staged approach” is a promising way to provide for dif-
ferentiated participation by developing countries’ (EC 2005:45).31  
3.2 The United States 
The United States was from the outset of climate negotiations far more 
sceptical to taking on binding commitments than the EU, a scepticism 
that culminated with its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001.32 
The economic aspects, more specifically the cost-effectiveness of climate 
policy, have been vital for both the choice of policy instrument and the 
degree of involvement in the international climate regime for the United 
States.33 For example, throughout the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the 
United States put much weight on the importance of flexibility and broad 
participation for keeping costs down. The Clinton administration’s sup-
port for Kyoto was based strictly on the assumption that international 
agreement could be achieved on some of the most disputed and conten-
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tious issues in the Protocol: full emissions trading, joint implementation, 
and participation by developing countries.34 
In the Kyoto protocol negotiations, the United States together with other 
members in the Umbrella group pushed for maximum flexibility. It op-
posed the EU on important positions, such as exempting the developing 
countries from binding commitments and imposing a ceiling for the use 
of Kyoto mechanisms to ensure that substantial action was taken domesti-
cally. The US also opposed the G77/China, insisting that developing 
countries must take on commitments in the first Kyoto period (2008-
2012). 
Economists predicted that the costs for the United States would be rela-
tively higher if emissions reductions were to be achieved in the short 
term, as with Kyoto. Furthermore, they calculated that the United States 
would bear the lion’s share of global costs in a Kyoto-like regime.35 With 
a rapidly growing population combined with high rates of economic 
growth, U.S. emissions have been increasing steadily over the past couple 
of decades (See figure 4). In Kyoto, the United States committed to cut 
emissions by 7% from 1990-levels, but during the 1990s its GHG emis-
sions has increased by 18%. Reversing this development would entail 
large costs.36 
As a consequence of potentially high costs for the United States, the 
United States Congress, with the support of influential stakeholder 
groups, consistently opposed the ‘targets and timetables’ approach that 
has been at the center of the Kyoto Protocol negotiation process.37 U.S. 
politicians have favored a longer term trajectory towards stabilizing 
concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere, arguing that it would in a 
more benign way secure continuous economic growth at the same time as 
it would mitigate climate changes.  
The policy instruments that have been applied in US climate policy have 
focused on tax incentives and energy efficiency as cost-effective solu-
tions for achieving reductions for companies, and on the needs for 
intensified research to reduce scientific uncertainty.38 During the 1990s 
US firms in general were hostile to the idea of accepting policy regula-
tions involving mitigation of GHG emissions. They adopted a confronta-
tional strategy to avoid mandatory regulations, involving strong political 
pressure and outreach campaigns to influence the public opinion.39 The 
Global Climate Coalition and Exxon were major driving forces behind 
that strategy. Over the last few years, there has been a more visible split 
between US firms continuing to pursue a confrontational strategy, and 
others who have decided to accept voluntary action to reduce their emis-
sions, including participating in emissions trading markets.40 For exam-
ple, Environmental Defence has facilitated the Partnership for Climate 
Action, where US-based companies have announced a goal of reducing 
their aggregate emissions by 15% from 1990 levels by 2010 using 
market-based mechanisms.41 These firms show an interest in taking part 
in the growing markets applying Kyoto mechanisms and flexible policy 
solutions, such as emissions trading, joint implementation projects, and 
the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund. 
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Figure 4: Economic development, population growth and emissions 
of CO2 in the United States for the period of 1971 to 2000.  
 United States 1971 - 2000
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Source: CAIT (WRI 2004). 
The NGO community has been divided over several issues, most notably 
the contributions of sinks – that is land use, land-use change and forestry 
– and the Kyoto mechanisms to the reduction of GHG emissions.42 This is 
largely due to different philosophies regarding the role of the market in 
global environmental governance. Environmental Defense has promoted 
market-based mechanisms and sinks as means to curb human-induced 
emissions. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and a few expert NGOs, in 
particular Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) and the 
Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development 
(FIELD), also had influence in the United Stated in the design of an ef-
fective and novel Kyoto compliance system. These organisations seem to 
have had some success with the insider strategy, framing issues in a crea-
tive and constructive way and providing expert advice to negotiators, par-
ticularly in the early phases of negotiations on new topics.43  
Considering the complexity of the climate issue, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that a non-confrontational insider strategy seems to have been more 
successful than traditional activism in influencing the international 
climate negotiations and domestic policy. In the US, however, this was 
before the election of George W. Bush to the US Presidency immediately 
following the suspension of COP6 at The Hague. As a result of the 
change of the US administration and the statement by President Bush that 
the US would not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol, environmental 
NGOs have almost given up on promoting the treaty in the US. Although 
European NGOs have been able to influence both international and 
domestic climate policy, US-based NGOs have focused on international 
talks, business and consumers to compensate for lack of access to their 
home government.44  
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Domestically in the United States, a much stronger public demand and 
pressure on policy outcome has come from parts of the industry lobby. 
Representatives of powerful corporations that stand to be adversely af-
fected by mitigation policies – in particular large energy corporations in 
the oil, gas, and coal industries – have continued to exercise substantial 
clout and effectively work against any kind of commitments.45 Multi-
national oil companies have different strategies for approaching climate 
change, but common grounds may be found in the link between interna-
tional institutions and major multinational companies at either side of the 
Atlantic. The Kyoto Protocol represents a potent political force that has 
affected, and will most likely continue to affect, US multinationals with 
significant activities in Europe.46 While the Kyoto Protocol restricts ac-
cess to participation in the Kyoto mechanisms to members of the Proto-
col, US multinationals operating in Europe and Japan will have to be in 
the same markets as companies that are operating on the inside of new 
‘carbon markets’. How the positive and negative consequences add up for 
US multinationals remains to be seen. But many companies have had 
experience reducing emissions and have proved that such reductions can 
be achieved without negative economic consequences or increased loss of 
jobs. It is becoming clear that the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
is a problem that is not impossible to solve, and that the policy solutions 
are within reach.47 It is, however, also clear that the business sector 
cannot be the main driving force behind a proactive development. Fair 
and credible governmental incentives are required to continue a process 
of innovation and change that can be a potent response to climate 
change.48 
In the absence of strong domestic political pressure within the United 
States in favor of a more proactive climate policy from the general public 
the Bush administration is unlikely to take steps towards a mandatory 
policy or indeed any policy to seriously limit greenhouse gas emissions. 
In US politics the Kyoto Protocol has become synonymous with a bur-
densome solution to the climate change problem, and has no chance of 
gaining support. However, the United States might become more open to 
reengaging in other forms of international climate policy cooperation. 
Concerns about the stringency and costs of emissions caps, including 
risks of unexpectedly high costs, will certainly constrain the range of tar-
gets that may be adopted by the United States for the foreseeable future. 
Technology focus – and more specifically interest in development of 
fossil-based no- or low-emissions technologies – is likely to be a resilient 
trait in the U.S. approach to climate policy even regardless of electoral 
outcomes.49 The Bush administration sees fossil fuels as pivotal to Amer-
ica’s future energy supply, even in a future where control of carbon 
emissions is deemed necessary. Commitment to the continued use of coal 
is not limited to the current administration. Since the oil shocks of the 
seventies, Americans have worried about their dependence on ‘foreign 
oil’. Environmental concerns apart, domestic coal constitutes a cheap and 
reliable alternative. Coal interests also have considerable political clout, 
as illustrated by the leading role Senator Robert Byrd of coal-rich West 
Virginia has played in opposing the Kyoto Protocol. The increased 
salience of energy security concerns in the post-September 11 political 
climate and the political realities stemming from the importance of coal 
in ‘swing states’ that tend to decide presidential elections and Congres-
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sional majorities have led moderate environmentalists, such as the Natu-
ral Resources Defence Council and leading Democrats, to embrace R&D 
spending for development of carbon sequestration and coal-derived 
hydrogen fuels.50 These observations suggest that research and develop-
ment activities regarding fossil-based technologies are likely to remain an 
area of intense interest for U.S. authorities – also with respect to possible 
international cooperation.  
As a result of these domestic policy traits, the United States changed its 
negotiating strategy since COP8 from insisting on developing country 
commitments to warning against it.51 The turnaround seems to be a result 
of outspoken opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, since it would affect the 
US economy negatively if emissions cuts are performed the way the Pro-
tocol determines. By supporting developing countries in not accepting 
commitments under such an international regime, and at the same time 
presenting new and alternative ways to reduce emissions that at the same 
time secure continued economic development, e.g. intensity targets or 
emissions relative to GDP, the US takes a stronger unilateral control over 
how it intends to handle the climate change issue. New coalitions are be-
ing built with both industrialized and developing countries, for instance 
with Australia, Italy, India, China, South Korea, and others, through bilat-
eral agreements that focus on technology R&D, and carbon storage solu-
tions rather than on short-term emissions reductions. In other words, the 
United States is engaging in new forms of multi- or bilateral cooperation, 
hence engaging in a new strategy for facing the challenges posed in the 
international climate change negotiations.  
3.3 China 
In the international negotiations, China in alliance with G77 has consist-
ently refused to take on and even discuss emission commitments, arguing 
that it has implemented extensive abatement measures despite its position 
as a developing country. China’s measures in relation to population con-
trol, energy efficiency and pricing are therefore arguments in the climate 
change discussion (See figure 5).  
Low per capita emissions has been an argument used by China in the 
negotiations – one eighth of the USA and about half of the world aver-
age52 – and places the responsibility of first-step emissions reductions on 
the Annex I countries. According to WRI’s CAIT-database however, 
China’s per capita emissions (2000 figures) are higher, about one sixth of 
the US’ (see figure 2). Although long awaited, China submitted its initial 
National Communications to the UNFCCC in November 2004.53 The 
National Communications indicate that China’s GHG emissions/CO2 
equivalents in 1994 were 3650 million tonnes, of which CO2, CH4 and 
N2O contributed 73 percent, 20 percent and 7 percent respectively.54 1994 
CO2 emissions were 2666 million tonnes, which is half of the figure 
applied in the CAIT base. Furthermore, China claims that the country’s 
historical contribution to climate change is low.55  
China is often perceived as one of the key countries in the international 
climate regime for the following two reasons. First, China is one of the 
key players in the global climate change game due to its status as the 
world’s second largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs) after the 
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USA. China contributed 13.5% of global CO2 emissions in 1996, whereas 
IEA figures say 17.2 %.56 As illustrated by figure 1, China’s share of the 
global GHG emissions was 14.8% in 2000, compared to the US share of 
20.6%. During the 1990s, China’s GHG emissions have increased by 
almost 40 percent due to strong economic growth (see figure 5), and IEA 
anticipate a yearly increase of 2,8% (IEA 2004). This view is contrasted 
by research results indicating that China managed to reduce emissions in 
the period 1996 to 1999.57 It is generally acknowledged, also by Chinese 
officials and academics, that the country will soon surpass the United 
States unless drastic measures are carried out.58 Second, China’s status 
and influence in the G77 makes it a key country in the climate nego-
tiations. As the world’s largest developing country with an influential 
voice in the United Nations, China is expected to play an important role 
in leading the developing countries in the future climate regime. On one 
hand, global climate change is not a critical priority for China, as the 
primary objective of the Chinese leaders is to develop the economy and 
improve the standard of living for China’s citizens, as well as to reduce 
local air pollution. On the other hand, Chinese scientists and bureaucrats 
are increasingly concerned about the impacts of climate change on 
China.59  
Since 1998, the National Development and Reform Commission has been 
responsible for co-ordinating work on domestic climate change in China; 
this illustrates the increased emphasis on climate change issues as the 
commission has the overall responsibility for the economic development 
issues in China. NDRC together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Ministry of Science and Technology are engaged in formulating 
China’s negotiation positions. China was initially sceptical to the intro-
duction of the Kyoto mechanisms under the UNFCCC, and saw JI and 
CDM as instruments for developed countries to run away from responsi-
bility. The country’s position towards the Kyoto mechanisms has never-
theless shifted from scepticism to a more pragmatic focus on maximising 
benefits. In the past few years, the process of establishing a national sys-
tem for identification, approval and implementation of CDM projects in 
China illustrates the changes in Chinese attitude towards the CDM after 
COP7.60 China at last announced the establishment of a Designated 
National Authority in June 2004 after some delay, and the State Council 
finally adopted and issued provisional rules for management of CDM 
projects.61 After more than one year, the revised measures for manage-
ment of CDM projects were introduced and were effective 12th October 
2005 (NDRC 2005); the measures replace the interim measures of 2004.62  
In addition, several CDM initiatives funded by bilateral and multilateral 
donors will contribute to capacity building in this area.63 China has devel-
oped important expertise in CMD policymaking within its bureaucracy, 
and has a few research institutes that focus mainly on technical aspects 
related to CDM projects. One challenge for China would be to include 
economists and market specialists in this work to gain understanding of 
the international market and thus increase the country’s ability to com-
pete internationally for CDM projects.64  
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Figure 5: Economic development, population growth and emissions 
of CO2 in China for the period of 1971 to 2000.  
With regard to future negotiations, China has approved the Kyoto Proto-
col (on 30 August 2002)65, but has opposed any discussion as to how and 
when developing countries shall take on commitments. Climate policy is 
defined as a foreign policy issue, and is thereby influenced by spill-over 
from other foreign policy areas. Sino-US relations in the field of climate 
policy have been influenced by the argument voiced by US climate policy 
sceptics that the United States should not take on serious commitments as 
long as major developing countries like China and India do not have 
similar commitments. China has emphasised that as long as the United 
States does not take on commitments, it would be politically unaccept-
able for them to do so.  
On the domestic level, taking on caps presents a risk of limiting the basic 
energy use for the population.66 This is anticipated to have grave conse-
quences for economic growth and thereby stability in the country. Also, 
China’s increasing urbanisation implies that energy use will also grow, 
since the rural population (768 million people)67 consumes limited energy 
at the moment. Currently, the consumption of rural energy is not counted 
in national energy statistics, thus the future emissions challenges will be 
in rural China.68 
The comments above indicate that China is unlikely to take on commit-
ments within the realms of the Kyoto Protocol in the near future. How-
ever, with China’s increasing emissions and its position as an emerging 
economic superpower, the pressure on China to take on commitments is 
intensifying. This is increasingly acknowledged by Chinese officials and 
is reported on in Chinese media.69 The development level of China will 
be important issue in the future negotiations for the 2nd commitment 
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period to begin in 2005. Incomes are rising and the estimated level of 
income using purchasing power parity is 4 times higher than the official 
Chinese figure.70 China however, states that it will keep its position as a 
developing country; the per capita GDP just passed USD 1000. 71 China 
generally has a great influence in the G77 and there are no indications 
that China would wish to leave the G77 in the near future.72 It is never-
theless noteworthy that negotiators from developed countries state after 
COP10 that they may detect a small change in the rhetoric of the Chinese 
delegation in the past year, albeit their basic principles have not changed. 
It has nevertheless become easier to communicate with China.73 It is 
premature to draw conclusions yet whether this will have any impact on 
the future role of China in the negotiations. China indicates that a differ-
ent approach may be needed that takes into consideration the needs of the 
developing world. The current debate is distanced from other domestic 
policy issues, and does not relate to the development priorities of China. 
Thus, implementation driven by China’s domestic needs may constitute a 
conceptual way for China to approach the climate change issue. In other 
words, development priorities could be used to frame the climate change 
debate. This may also lead to China playing a more active and positive 
role in the climate change negotiations, which may result in greater in-
volvement by other major developing countries.  
3.4 Russia 
Russia’s positive attitude to the Kyoto Protocol was initially firmly knit 
to the then assumed participation by the United States and the anticipa-
tion of economic gains from emissions trading between Annex I coun-
tries. In this phase, Russia supported the United States against the EU at 
difficult turning points in the international negotiations. After the United 
States withdrew from Kyoto, Russia performed a painful reorientation 
towards the EU; painful mainly because the outlook for economic gains 
was dramatically reduced. Russia sided with the EU when it became clear 
that the EU took over as the main driving force to implement an emis-
sions trading system. 
The Russian attitude to the Kyoto process and the further development of 
the climate regime has been framed by four major factors: first, the un-
resolved issues in Russian climate policy; second, the internal institution-
al struggles; third, strong economic interests; and finally, external tacit 
bargaining. Economic growth and emissions of CO2 are closely linked in 
the Russian economy, with both trends peaking in 1989, and sharply 
falling as a result of the breakdown of the communist regime in 1990. 
From 1990 to 1998, Russian CO2-emissions decreased by 35.6 %.74 After 
1998, however, both GDP and greenhouse gas emissions are on the rise 
again (see figure 6).  
As long as the climate problem has been on the international political 
agenda, there has been widespread climate scepticism in the Russian 
scientific establishment.75 Prominent scientists have argued against the 
existence of anthropogenic climate effects, and some hold the view that 
on the balance, climate change would be good for Russia. This was a 
major reason why Russia was considered a laggard in the early phase of 
the climate negotiations.76 In addition, there was widespread concern that 
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emission targets would harm Russian economic growth – arguments 
similar to those heard from developing countries. When Russia changed 
its positions and decided to accept binding targets by signing the Kyoto 
Protocol, it was no secret that the very promising economic benefits 
provided by the Kyoto mechanisms were a decisive factor.77  
Figure 6: Economic development, population growth and emissions 
of CO2 in Russia for the period of 1971 to 2000. 
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After Kyoto an internal institutional battle became a major problem in 
Russian climate politics. In light of the enormous transfers promised by 
Kyoto, controlling positions in the development and future implementa-
tion of Russian climate policy became major stakes. This internal battle 
negatively affected further development of Russian climate policy: few 
AIJ projects were carried through, and reporting systems and inventories 
were delayed.78 Also, there has been no settlement on the key issue of 
who owns the surplus quotas – ‘hot air’ – which was considered to yield 
enormous revenues under the Kyoto Protocol.  
But even if there were conflicts between state agencies, climate policy 
was not really very visible on the crowded Russian political agenda. The 
top level of government was not involved in climate politics, and there 
was not much public debate. Over the last few years this has changed. 
Russian industries have finally started to show interest in the Kyoto 
mechanisms, notably the state-owned electricity system (UES), which 
established a carbon fund with the purpose of selling emission rights in 
exchange for investments in increased efficiency in the sector. Also the 
gas giant Gazprom has shown interest, in particular through co-operation 
with Ruhrgas. These industries, which are the biggest emitters, are 
against the sale of surplus quotas, since they have a vast amount of 
‘fresh’ emission reductions to offer for emissions trading or joint imple-
mentation projects. 
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The exit of the United States from the Kyoto process had a dual effect on 
Russia. First, it meant that the outlook for big revenues was sharply 
reduced. This had the effect of turning many against ratification of the 
protocol. Second, it left Russia in a key role in determining whether the 
protocol would be implemented or not. These two developments form the 
background for the latest round in Russian climate politics starting in 
April 2002. Prime Minister Kasyanov set in motion a process that many 
outside Russia saw as a promise of ratification.79 After just a few months 
it became evident that there were obstacles, and Russian officials, while 
in principle endorsing Kyoto, claimed that additional assurances of quota 
purchases or investments were necessary to secure Russian ratification. 
This was also the indirect message from President Putin at the climate 
conference held in Moscow September-October 2003.80 Thus the ratifica-
tion issue had definitely entered high politics, connected to World Trade 
Organization (WTO) membership, broader economic and energy co-
operation with the EU, and geopolitical considerations – especially the 
relations with the United States.  
The EU officially rejected a link to WTO membership, but the two issues 
were both discussed at an EU-Russia summit 21 May 2004. The EU 
endorsed Russian membership in WTO, while Putin said that ‘we support 
the Kyoto process. We have some concerns linked to the obligations we 
must take upon ourselves… We will speed up the process towards Rus-
sian ratification’.81 Putin thus came out more strongly in support of 
ratification than before, without ruling out the possibility of further nego-
tiations. Apparently the relationship to the EU as well as clarification of 
acceptable WTO terms played a major role when finally, on 30 Septem-
ber 2004, the Russian government made the decision to propose to the 
Duma that Russia ratify the Kyoto Protocol. On 22 October 2004 the 
Duma ratified the Protocol.  
Earlier, as when Kasyanov apparently set the process ‘in motion’ in 2002, 
the existence of draft legislation for implementing Kyoto and regulating 
key issues, such as the ownership of quotas, had been presented as a pre-
requisite for making a decision on ratification. But as long as the Presi-
dent gave no clear signal about his intentions, next to nothing happened. 
With the decision on 30 September, the government cut through this knot 
by endorsing ratification in principle – and at the same time ordering rele-
vant ministries and other government bodies to work out a plan for imple-
mentation of the Protocol.82 
Even though Russia now has ratified Kyoto, the further development of 
Russian climate policy as well as negotiating positions can not be expect-
ed to be a smooth ride. More domestic actors are likely to get involved as 
the distribution of short term benefits from implementation get clearer. 
This can mean new conflicts and stalemates. In the negotiations on post-
2012 the widely held reservations due to expected costs for Russia may 
re-emerge and make the country reluctant to take on more ambitious tar-
gets. These reservations are likely to have strong support until it can be 
demonstrated that also in Russia economic growth does not necessarily 
entail corresponding growth in energy consumption. On the other hand, if 
the government is able to overcome internal feuds and develop a good 
way of implementing Kyoto, increasing numbers of domestic actors are 
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likely to realize the potential of the Kyoto mechanisms.83 They may exert 
some influence on negotiating positions. Nevertheless, industrial involve-
ment is still in an early stage, and it is uncertain what will be the domi-
nant position of e.g. the oil industry, the strongest lobbying group in the 
country. 
Also after Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the underlying cli-
mate scepticism remains. Russia is still a long way from a national con-
sensus on the climate problem and the correct remedies.  
4. Implications of shifting alliances 
The dynamics of the climate negotiations changed markedly after the 
U.S. repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol. The continued process of nego-
tiation – and not least the making of a ‘new’ regime embedded in an 
existing regime84 – will depend upon the ‘lessons learned’ through the 
implementation experiences on the part of pivotal actors using different 
policy mechanisms. Extrapolation of current policy-trends in the four key 
countries examined here points to a rather gloomy future for international 
climate cooperation prior to 2012. Even though the Kyoto Protocol and 
its mechanisms have engaged new actors and initiated new policies, and 
will supposedly continue to do so in the coming years, resistance to real 
and binding targets under an international agreement will be strong. 
Hence, continuation of the current negotiation modus under the UNFCCC 
seems unlikely to be successful in engaging all major emitters in a 
meaningful way in the near future. 
Even though the Protocol has entered into force, considerable creativity is 
needed on the design of a future climate regime. This might include a 
new opportunity to engage the Annex I parties which have resisted ratifi-
cation of the Protocol (like the United States), as well as major develop-
ing countries with large or rapidly increasing GHG emissions (like 
China). Negotiations for the second commitment period are according to 
Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol, scheduled to commence no later than in 
2005. However, at COP10 in 2004 the parties to the UNFCCC were not 
able to agree on whether or when these negotiations should start. They 
could not even agree on an official reporting format from the workshops 
to be organised the following year.  
We find that there are at least two possible consequences for the future of 
the climate regime resulting from the new strategies of the four key act-
ors. First, it seems like the trend of EU leadership in the push for 
ratification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and pushing for 
negotiations about future commitments is being enhanced. At COP10, the 
EU was clearly taking the lead in initiating discussions about future 
commitments.85 Therefore, the performance of the EU and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol will have symbolic effects. Whether or not it is deemed a success 
will be important for the dynamics of future negotiations, both partici-
pants and non-participants of the Protocol. The EU has already decided to 
act as a pioneer in terms of implementing an emissions trading system 
from 2005 (see section 3.1). Seeking stability in its climate policy, the 
EU wants to maximize participation. Russia took advantage of its pivotal 
position, and increasingly demanded side-payments to ratify. At Marra-
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kech, Russia achieved side-payments within the frames of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol in terms of being allowed to increase its use of sinks in its GHG 
emissions accountancy. In 2004, Russia demanded side-payments also 
outside the frames of the Protocol in terms of linkage between ratification 
and accession to WTO (see section 3.4). 
With the Protocol in force, we believe that ‘the proof of the pudding will 
be in the eating’. If emissions trading and other Kyoto mechanisms turn 
out to be a success, the EU and its Kyoto partners would be in a stronger 
position for steering the direction of future negotiations. If the EU fails to 
fulfill its commitments, or emissions trading turns out to be more difficult 
or more unsuccessful than expected, they will be in a weaker position for 
having a decisive say for the future direction of the climate negotiations. 
This would complicate future negotiations, and most likely mean 
postponement of more comprehensive and environmentally effective 
policy action to mitigate climate change.  
Second, the experiences made since COP8 tell us that the United States 
has changed its strategy from insisting on developing country commit-
ments to warning against it, and has thereby entered into a direct opposi-
tion to the Kyoto Protocol and future commitments. The United States 
seems to be building new collaboration with both industrialized and 
developing countries, e.g. with Australia, India, China, through bilateral 
agreements. The United States has shown continued belief in technology 
development as the most cost-effective and environmentally efficient 
strategy to meet the climate change problem. In particular, carbon capture 
and geological storage technology is at the center of US attention, and 
constitutes a vital part of its current strategy. By entering into bilateral 
agreements with like-minded countries that share their belief in technol-
ogy solutions, the United States can secure more unilateral control over 
its approach to climate policy than was the case in the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations.  
One of China’s main arguments in the negotiations so far has been that it 
would be impossible for the country to take on commitments as long as 
the United States refuses to do so. The current changes of strategies may 
result in several scenarios for China: The most likely scenario is the 
‘business as usual’ – given the current situation where poverty alleviation 
and developing the economy are the main priorities, it is hard to believe 
that China suddenly will take on commitments to reduce its emissions. 
Nevertheless, there is a need to solve local pollution problems in the 
country, and bilateral and multilateral projects (such as energy related 
projects) may contribute to lower emissions, although not specifically be-
cause of climate change concerns.86 The second scenario is that stronger 
US-China relations on related issues such as economic development, 
trade and alternative approaches to adaptation and mitigation, could 
distance China from the international negotiations and the tight binding to 
G77. China’s role in the negotiations might hence be altered through bi-
lateral co-operation with the United States. A third possibility is that with 
China’s increasing importance and participation in world affairs, the 
country will take on a more responsible and positive role in order to make 
the United States look like the laggard. In a game of ‘changing roles’, 
China may soften its position. However, if China were to take on com-
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mitments, it would have to gain substantial benefits like technology trans-
fer and/or funding. Furthermore, even though China is no longer a poor 
developing country it would be politically difficult to leave the G77. 
Membership there still provides many valuable benefits such as a leader-
ship role in the G77 and influence through the G77 on the negotiations.  
We have identified several cases of shifting strategies and relations as a 
result of the altered engagement from the United States. In that respect 
we have pointed out how understanding domestic policies and pressure 
groups within the four key countries examined here is vital to understand-
ing the positions and strategies they have adopted in the international 
negotiations. While the United States and pivotal developing countries 
have joined forces as a result of a rather paradoxical common interest in 
postponing discussions about future commitments at the latest COPs,87 
the EU and Russia have found it important to support each other to make 
possible an international emissions trading system. 
The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol may be seen as a political suc-
cess, although it is well documented that its environmental effect is very 
limited.88 In terms of hard commitments the Kyoto Protocol can be de-
scribed as a ‘mini-regime’, as the overwhelming majority of the nations 
of the world not have to reduce emissions to comply with the Protocol.89 
Developing countries do not have to reduce emissions, and economies in 
transition (EIT) countries as well as some other key countries will meet 
their commitments with little or no effort. Hence, the Kyoto Protocol may 
well be a political achievement, but the real long-term challenges in 
transforming this ‘mini-regime’ into a truly global regime still lie ahead. 
Russia will have a key role in terms of how it chooses to act in the 
emissions trading market. There is a huge difference between a Russia 
that sells quotas to reinvest in its industries, and a Russia that sells ‘hot 
air’. The potential pathway of Russia will have consequences for the 
legitimacy of the Protocol and its planned emissions trading system. A 
Kyoto Protocol with considerable legitimacy might create international 
pressure that reverberates in domestic US politics, challenging the current 
perception in the United States that voluntary programs are the only 
policy that the constellation of domestic political actors can agree to. This 
could, in turn, lead to support of activities in Congress such as senators 
Lieberman and McCain’s Climate Stewardship Act of 2005.90 If not, a 
different climate regime may allow a long-term emissions reductions 
target, broad participation, and flexibility. In the United States, this would 
open for implementing policy instruments that credibly reduce economic 
uncertainty, which may increase willingness to adopt targets.  
At the moment, it seems most likely that the United States will further 
develop its inclination to adopt technology-oriented policy solutions. This 
is the main field where the Bush administration has taken an initiative for 
further developing multilateral cooperation on mitigation policies, 
through e.g. the intergovernmental Carbon Sequestration Leadership For-
um (CSFL), the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy 
(IPHE), the Methane-to-Markets Partnership, and the Asia-Pacific Part-
nership on Clean Development and Climate.91 This issue area could po-
tentially be the one area where multilateral engagement from the United 
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States is possible until the country is ready to reengage in negotiations on 
emissions reduction commitments. It could prove to be a path for nurtur-
ing cooperation with selected countries and keeping the issue warm.92  
Another vital factor for success of a future climate regime is that the EU 
emissions trading system and the international emissions trading system 
under the Kyoto protocol turns out to be a success. The fact that the EU 
system has been successfully planned and that the EU members have 
managed to reach an agreement does not guarantee that the policy will 
result in environmental and economical efficiency. In the time perspec-
tive pre-2012, however, there is no doubt that the EU emissions trading 
system will be important as a reality-test for carbon emissions trading – a 
concept that has never been tested on such a large scale before. 
5. Conclusions 
We have identified three important shifts of strategies and relations in the 
international climate negotiations as a result of the United States repudia-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol. First, the EU has become a more pronounced 
leader in terms of moving the Kyoto Protocol process forward. In collab-
oration with some of the members of the Umbrella group the EU has 
rallied around the Protocol, and secured its ratification and entry into 
force. Second, Russia has changed its strategy from previously support-
ing the United States, to currently supporting the EU in securing the entry 
into force of the Kyoto Protocol. Third, the United States has shifted its 
strategy towards a tacit understanding with the G77/China in not accept-
ing future commitments to reduce GHG emissions, based on paradoxi-
cally different reasons. 
These shifting strategies are founded in domestic climate policy develop-
ments, and we show how interest groups, distribution of costs, and policy 
preferences of domestic actors have consequences for what happens at 
the international level. We point to the EU’s persistence and leadership in 
climate policy. Once the wide-ranging EU policy system is set on a poli-
cy course, options for altering the course is limited by the complexity, 
time, and resources involved in reaching a new consensus. The United 
States, on the other hand, has been bound by strong interest groups that 
stand to loose from emissions reductions, and a political majority in 
Congress that is unwilling to accept commitments in terms of emissions 
reductions that can lead to relative economic loss. China has also shown 
unwillingness to take on commitments, although the reasoning differs 
from the US’; to secure economic development and greater fairness for 
developing countries. In Russia, the delay of ratification of the Protocol 
was found to be a result of elements like internal institutional struggles, 
strong economic interests, and external tacit bargaining. 
The implications of the shifting strategies for the future dynamics and 
development of the climate negotiations are found to be, first, that much 
hinges on the experiences we will gain from seeing international emis-
sions trading of GHGs in practice for the first time under the auspices of 
the Kyoto Protocol. The success or failure of the Kyoto Protocol will be 
decisive for the bargaining power of the EU and other Kyoto members in 
future negotiations. Second, we find that since the United States has 
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changed its strategy from insisting on developing country commitments 
to warning against it, the US has entered into a direct opposition to the 
Kyoto Protocol and future commitments. By entering into bilateral agree-
ments that focus on R&D and technology solutions, the United States can 
secure more unilateral control over its approach to climate policy than 
was the case in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. These kinds of bilateral 
agreements might be the beginning of an alternative track to international 
climate cooperation – outside the auspices of the United Nations, or as a 
parallel track.  
After ten years of international negotiations about how to address the cli-
mate change problem, the countries of the world have gained substantial 
experience and understanding for the complexity and political difficulties 
involved. In that respect, policy solutions for how to address the problem 
are better known today than in the early 1990s, as a result of the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations. The international climate regime is, however, still 
marred by the constant and recurring dilemmas that cooperation on a 
global public good incorporate. In that context, it is very hard to identify 
a common political approach to address the problem as long as the uncer-
tainties involved continue to be high and the issue of fair burden sharing 
is explicitly/apparently present. 
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